Employment-based Earned-Time Credits in Adult Supervision


In recent years, policy experts and corrections officials alike have sounded the alarm about overcrowded prisons and jails, excessive supervision caseloads, and structural failures that put Americans at risk from a cycle of crime. Policymakers from across the political spectrum cannot ignore the exploding costs of prison and the staggering rates of recidivism—both indicators of a costly system that is not effectively protecting public safety and promoting rehabilitation.

Public safety should be the foremost concern of criminal justice, which requires recognizing that 95 percent of state prisoners are eventually released back into their communities.¹ Corrections systems need to be reoriented around changing behavior, equipping people with the tools to rebuild their lives, and facilitating safe re-entry back into communities. Most importantly, Americans leaving prisons need to get back to work.

To that end, policymakers and corrections administrators should craft incentive-based policies that encourage people to take clear and measurable steps towards law-abiding and productive livelihoods. The most effective policies empower people to take responsibility for their own success and reward them for reaching milestones towards that end.

Probation and parole earned-time credits offer people incremental reductions to their supervision sentences as rewards for making progress towards safely re-entering society. Earned-time credit systems typically reward individuals for achieving specific goals, such as completing rehabilitation programs, attaining high school or college diplomas, or maintaining employment. Some states offer earned-time credits for broad compliance with the conditions of supervision, such as avoiding technical violations. Generally, time credit programs provide a powerful incentive for individuals to make meaningful progress towards re-entry into their communities while also reducing burdensome caseloads and allowing probation and parole officers to focus on higher risk individuals. The ideal earned-time credit system would reward the most desirable ultimate outcome for people on probation and parole—which is stable, lawful employment.

PROBLEMS IN COMMUNITY SUPERVISION

Community supervision collectively refers to two institutions: probation and parole. In most states, probation functions as a community-centered alternative to institutional incarceration, such as jail or prison.² Depending on the state, people on probation are supervised by county probation departments or probation divisions of the state department of corrections. Parole is separate from probation but works in a similar manner. Parole is administered by state agencies, sometimes in concert with probation, and offers people in prison an opportunity to serve a portion of their sentence in the community, subject to the approval of a parole board.

The intentions of both probation and parole are to offer structured, low-cost supervision of criminally involved individuals while they lead law-abiding lives. If someone exhibits signs of bad behavior while on supervision, such as missing or failing a drug test, a probation or parole officer can request a judge to send the individual to jail or prison through what is called a “technical revocation. ”Judges will also revoke probation and parole if individuals are arrested or convicted of new crimes.

Crime is a major problem among people on community supervision. Nationwide, over 100,000 people are sent to prison for new crimes committed while on supervision, accounting for one in five admissions to prison.³ Nearly two-thirds of people released from state prison are reincarcerated within three years, the period during which most people released from prison are on parole.⁴ Recidivism is the central problem in probation and parole. To achieve enduring reform and keep the public safe, new policies must also target the underlying causes of reoffending. Long supervision terms and high caseloads contribute to both technical and new crime revocation rates by spreading officers’ resources thin. Nationally, the average probation term is just under two years. State-specific average probation terms, however, vary widely. For example, New Jersey’s and Hawaii’s averages are both over four years, whereas Massachusetts’ average is only nine months.⁵ There is even more variation among different offense types. In Georgia, drug offenders typically receive probation sentences ranging from five to seven years, compared to an average of only twenty months across all offenses.⁶ Long supervision sentences bloat the caseloads that officers manage. The American Probation and Parole Association recommends that caseloads should not exceed 50:1 for officers working with moderate to high-risk individuals and 200:1 for those working with low-risk individuals.⁷ Caseloads often exceed twice these recommended levels, making it impossible for officers to allocate their time effectively.⁸

The challenges posed by high caseloads are further complicated by disparities in the risk levels of the individuals serving them. Routine meetings with low-risk offenders distract officers from the serious task of supporting and supervising those more likely to re-offend. Higher-risk individuals often require substantially more guidance and intervention from officers. Lower-risk individuals, however, are actually more likely to re-offend if officers disrupt employment and other prosocial activities by devoting too much attention to them.⁹ Thus, policies that can safely lower caseloads to manageable levels will allow officers to focus efforts and resources on those who need them most and in turn drive better outcomes.

INCENTIVIZING SUCCESS: EARNED-TIME CREDITS

Numerous states have experimented with offender-oriented incentive programs to address high revocation and recidivism rates, long supervision terms, and cumbersome caseloads. So-called “earned-time credits” show the most promise due to their goal-oriented nature and potential to safely reduce supervision population levels. Earned-time credit systems reward people in prison or on supervision for certain types of behavior or for achievements that are associated with a lower likelihood of committing new crimes. Successful individuals are rewarded with credits of time—usually measured in days—towards their prison or supervision sentences, allowing them to terminate their sentences earlier than they were expected to. Earned-time credit systems create powerful incentives for individuals to make meaningful progress towards re-entry while simultaneously reducing long supervision sentences and high caseloads through merit.

The research in support of earned-time credits is compelling. At a fundamental level, incentive-based programs are widely considered integral to successful supervision. Numerous studies indicate that incentives reinforce positive behaviors that individuals might otherwise struggle with and effectively improve supervision outcomes.¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² The American Probation and Parole Association recommends that officers use incentives in concert with sanctions in order to achieve the best results.¹³ These findings align with what people on supervision themselves are saying. A survey of people on probation conducted by the Utah Criminal Justice Center at the University of Utah found that 70percent of respondents indicated that incentives motivated them to comply with the rules of their supervision and work harder towards re-entering society.¹⁴ Not all incentives are equal though. A study in Corrections: Policy, Practice, and Research found that the quality of the incentive plays an important role in promoting behavioral change.¹⁵ The same study found that earning time off one’s sentence was the highest-rated incentive among people on supervision, followed by fee waivers¹⁶ and reduced check-in requirements.¹⁷ Researchers at the University of Utah found that respondents to their survey also viewed time credits as the most favorable incentive.¹⁸

Of course, allowing people on supervision to earn their way to early release raises reasonable concerns about public safety. The evidence, however, suggests that early termination of supervision in an earned-time credit program does not negatively impact public safety. Individuals released early from probation and parole in Missouri under that state’s earned-time credit program had statistically insignificant rates of re-offense.¹⁹ Data on people discharged early from New York City’s probation system actually shows that early termination could decrease the likelihood of re-offense.²⁰ Even a look at the raw numbers from the Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that most individuals re-offend early on in their supervision or after release from prison. In a nine-year follow-up on state prisoners released in 2005, eighty-two percent of prisoners who were arrested after release were arrested within the first three years.²¹

Earned-time credits can result in desirable outcomes for both supervisees and officers by helping the most successful individuals get off supervision caseloads in an efficient and safe way. But the key to designing an effective earned-time credit system is making sure that rewards are tied to the right ultimate outcomes.

TYPES OF EARNED-TIME CREDIT POLICIES

There are sixteen states with earned-time credit policies, but they do not all target the same types of outcomes. Earned-time credit systems typically reward three types of outcomes: general compliance with the rules of supervision; completion of rehabilitative, behavioral, or substance abuse programs; or completion of educational or vocational training. Rewarding employment outcomes is a relatively new approach, but it holds much promise.

Rewarding General Compliance

Nine states allow people on supervision to earn time credits for generally abiding by the rules of their supervision for certain durations of time.²² Most of these states restrict who can earn credits depending on the type of offense they were convicted of. Those individuals who are eligible for credits are rewarded with a certain number of time credits for every thirty days of compliance, defined as not breaking any laws or technical rules of supervision. Individuals earn different amounts of credit depending on the reward structure of their state. In Nevada, for example, individuals can earn ten days of credit for every thirty days of compliance, while in Arizona and South Carolina, they can earn twenty credits for the same period.²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ Other states, like Missouri and Arkansas, reward thirty days of credit for thirty days of compliance.²⁶ ²⁷ Typically, if individuals subsequently violate the terms of their supervision to a sufficient degree or are revoked to prison, they lose their accrued time credits.

The general compliance model tends to substantially reduce the supervised population and caseloads since credits are earned regularly and frequently and are not constrained by program availability (as with rehabilitation and substance abuse programs) or opportunity costs (as with education and training).

Several states have demonstrated that issuing earned-time credits for general compliance can result in a number of desirable outcomes.

The most expansive earned-time credits policy—and the most rigorously studied—was passed in Missouri in 2012, alongside another reform that expanded the use of intermediate punishments for violations, known as “swift and certain sanctions.” An extensive study of the earned-time credits policy by the Pew Charitable Trusts had a number of promising findings. After a decade of rising supervision populations, Missouri’s earned-time credit policy helped reduce the supervised population by eighteen percent, or roughly 13,000 people, in only three years.²⁸ As a result, the average officer caseload in Missouri dropped sixteen percent over the same period. Ninety-three percent of the individuals who earned credits were nonviolent offenders, and they earned an average of fourteen months off their supervision sentences.²⁹ Most importantly, there was no statistically significant difference in the post-termination recidivism rates of the individuals discharged early and those released before the policy went into effect.³⁰

The Pew study does not, however, cover the impact of the earned-time credit policy on revocation rates. Supervision violation rates actually increased between 2012 and 2018, before declining substantially in 2019.³¹ Commitments to short-term confinement³² and long-term drug programs³³ and revocations to prison all rose following the reforms in 2012, particularly in 2014 and 2015 when the largest number of people were terminated early for accruing earned-time credits.³⁴ The increases in violations may have been the result of two different policy changes. The rise in lesser sanctions, like short-term confinement and long-term drug programs, were probably the result of expanded use of swift and certain sanctions, which occurred simultaneously with the rollout of the earned-time credit policy. The rise in full revocations to prison, however, could have been connected indirectly to the earned-time credits policy itself, which had an unintended impact on the funding available for rehabilitation programs. Missouri’s Division of Probation and Parole funds rehabilitative programs with fees collected from individuals on supervision, so when thousands of people on probation and parole were terminated early as a result of accruing earned-time credits and the total supervision population declined, the Division was left with less funding for rehabilitation.³⁵ Lower funding for rehabilitation programs likely contributed to the increase in revocations. Thus, the indirect adverse impact of the earned-time credits policy on revocation rates could have been mitigated by supplying some amount of funding to recoup the Division’s fiscal losses.

South Carolina overhauled its supervision policies in 2010 based on twenty-four recommendations from a statewide taskforce, one of which was to create an earned-time credit program. The program saw increasing success over the next eight years as participation expanded. The rate of eligible people earning credits more than doubled in that period and the portion of credits denied for noncompliance declined twelve percent.³⁶ These changes indicate that as more people on supervision had access to incentives, many of those individuals responded with greater willingness to comply to the rules of supervision. This policy seems to have impacted both compliance and new offense revocations, which each dropped by roughly sixty percent between 2010 and 2018, though it is unclear how much of that drop was due to earned-time credits specifically, given the twenty-four other recommendations that impacted supervision simultaneously.³⁷

Arizona began issuing earned-time credits to its probation population as part of the Safe Communities Act (2008), which established incentive systems for both probationers and probation departments.³⁸ Over the next ten years, revocations to prison dropped by nearly one-third even as officers’ caseloads were statutorily increased by eight percent.³⁹ Parsing which parts, if any, of the Safe Communities Act contributed most to the successful reductions in revocations is challenging, but the available evidence suggests that earned-time credits had a powerful impact on achieving higher levels of compliance and lower revocations. The most important context to evaluating the impact of the incentive systems in the Safe Communities Act is that the performance incentive system created for probation departments never received any funding.⁴⁰ ⁴¹ That funding would have been used to reward departments for achieving reductions in revocations, but no such rewards were ever distributed. While the expectation of funding likely did contribute to the improvements made in the first year or two after the Safe Communities Act was passed, it is unlikely that departments’ improvements were the results of the performance incentive system after those expectations faded. After the performance incentive system’s repeal in 2011, no measurable improvements could reasonably be connected to the policy. An unpublished study on the earned-time credits system, however, showed that roughly half of the individuals eligible for credits did in fact earn them by complying with the terms of their supervision.⁴² While only 8 percent of eligible individuals kept their credits long enough to earn early termination, the same study found that the leading reason that individuals lost their accrued time credits was for being unable to pay fines and fees, a violation that usually results in a lesser sanction than revocation to prison. Thus, earned-time credits did appear to encourage better behavior among people on probation, contributing to the successful reduction of supervision revocations.

The outcomes demonstrated by Missouri, South Carolina, and Arizona make it clear that earned-time credit policies require a great deal of care and consideration in their design. Even among programs that reward the same outcome—compliance—the impact of each policy varied considerably. Generally, earned-time credits for compliance appear to be effective at safely reducing the supervised population without increases in crime and lowering revocation rates. However, general compliance credits are controversial because they merely reward individuals for doing the minimum in order to make progress towards re-entry, rather than rewarding more desirable outcomes, like employment.

Rewarding Rehabilitative Program Completion

A few states, like Texas, reward people on supervision with time off of their sentences for completing behavioral rehabilitative programs, but there is very limited research on program-based earned-time credit systems for people on probation and parole.⁴³

Marginally more attention has been paid to program-based earned-time credit systems in prisons, where they are most commonly found.⁴⁴ Notably, the First Step Act (2017) created an earned-time credit program for Federal prisoners that completed rehabilitation programming. Very few studies have been conducted on the effects of this policy, but the idea is intuitive: more people will participate in programs that are shown to reduce recidivism if they are rewarded for doing so. A preliminary report on earned-time credits in federal prisons found that earned-time credits did lead to higher participation rates in rehabilitative programs—30.8 percent participation among credit-eligible individuals, versus 18.8 percent of credit-ineligible individuals.⁴⁵ The impact of these higher participation rates on recidivism, however, remains unknown. Far more studies have been conducted on the effectiveness of specific programs, the findings of which indicate that behavioral rehabilitative programs generally reduce recidivism, though quality varies immensely.⁴⁶ The problem with providing earned-time credits for completing rehabilitative programs is that there is no guarantee that the programs are actually high-quality or, in many cases, even available.

The situation in Federal Bureau of Prisons facilities is instructive of the shortcomings of policies that offer earned-time credits for program completion. An independent review of the First Step Act’s implementation in the Bureau of Prisons found a number of issues with the newly created earned-time credit policy.⁴⁷ Foremost, the regulations governing the federal earned-time credits policy require that an inmate participate in 240 hours of programming in order to earn the minimum ten days of time credit (there are no smaller denominations of earnable credit),but only fourteen of the seventy-one programs that are designated to be “credit-eligible” are long enough for inmates to reach the required 240 hours. Moreover, these fourteen programs are available at only a handful of facilities. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Prisons does not evaluate all seventy-one of the designated programs based on participant outcomes, so the evidence supporting the programs’ effectiveness is flimsy. Thus, the Federal earned-time credit system’s design hinders its own successful implementation.

There are many barriers to creating a successful earned-time credit policy that rewards program completion. With robust performance evaluations and accreditations of rehabilitation programs and significantly expanded offerings of and access to programming, such a policy could be implemented effectively. There are not, however, existing successful models to learn from and replicate.

Rewarding Educational and Vocational Completion

Policies that reward educational or vocational program completion with earned-time credits are frequently found in prisons, though some states, such as Kentucky and Texas, offer credits to people on supervision as well.⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ There are no recent studies on these programs and their effects on participation or recidivism rates. However, the evidence from other types of earned-time credits policies suggest that rewarding training completion would increase participation. Studies on the impact of education and vocational training on recidivism would also suggest that earned-time credits based on completion of those programs would reduce the likelihood of re-offense. A 2016 report by the RAND corporation found that people who participated in educational programs while in prison were 46 percent less likely to reoffend.⁵¹ A study on GED and college programs in Ohio’s prisons found that the closer that inmates completed their programs to their release date, the less likely they were to return to prison.⁵² While working toward education while on supervision may present additional challenges for individuals trying to get back on their feet, extrapolating the evidence from the Ohio program might suggest that doing so could reduce recidivism.

THE KEY TO SUCCESS: EMPLOYMENT

It is important to note that educational programs and vocational training are associated with reduced recidivism primarily because of their effects on employment, job stability, and income. Education and vocational training allow individuals to compete for better jobs, which in turn makes crime less attractive. Evidence from other studies regarding the elasticity of crime with respect to wage rates suggests that a significant part of the measured effect of education on crime can be attributed to the increase in wages associated with schooling. Higher wage employment, not schooling itself, raises the opportunity cost of crime and thus reduces criminal activity.⁵³ This is in line with other studies that suggest that employment is associated with lower chances of recidivism.⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ Studies into the impact of certain characteristics of employment on recidivism found that job stability in particular decreased the likelihood of reoffending.⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ Earned-time credit models should take these factors into consideration. Rewarding individuals for staying employed for consistent intervals would incentivize the right behaviors among people on probation and parole more directly than education or vocational training. Such a model would also have the added benefit of being rewarded on a regular basis, in a way similar to general compliance credits. This hybrid approach would combine the benefits of the two best performing types of earned-time credits. In 2020, Kentucky passed an earned-time credits policy that includes “work for time credit.”⁵⁸ While the policy is too recent to evaluate, this hybrid design is very promising.

POLICY PROPOSAL: EARNED-TIME CREDITS FOR EMPLOYMENT

States should focus their earned-time credit programs on rewarding stable employment outcomes. Rewarding individuals for stable employment combined the regularity and breadth of access of general compliance time credits with the goal-based orientation of program-completion time credits. Incentivizing positive employment goals will help push obstinate offenders to take meaningful steps towards re-entry while helping successful offenders move off of supervision more quickly. This policy will align individual incentives towards long-term goals shown to reduce recidivism, while also effectively lowering caseloads and supervised populations.

Setting a sensible ratio of credits per period of time employed is key to successful implementation. Important considerations include minimizing the administrative work of probation and parole officers, setting achievable goals, and issuing credits at regular intervals. Setting a higher reward threshold for earning credits (i.e., X amount of credits for six months of employment) would likely lead to unnecessary setbacks in accumulating credits, limit economic mobility, and be burdensome for officers to verify. A lower reward threshold, such as X credits per week or per month, is more sensible and flexible. Kentucky’s earned-time credit system rewards individuals with one day of sentence credit per forty-hour work week. With an average probation term of thirty-four months, a typical Kentuckian on probation who has stayed employed for his whole sentence could get off about four months earlier than his peers. A weekly threshold seems workable but given that many earned-time credit programs for general compliance work on a monthly schedule, another option would be to reward four to five days of credit per thirty-day period. The best model will vary among state systems, depending primarily on any existing reporting schedule and the preferences of the probation and parole officers.

It is challenging to quantify the impact of this reform on a state’s supervision system, given the inconsistencies in how much earned-time credits have improved supervision systems in the past, and that only one state has recently adopted the most similar system to the one that is proposed. We can estimate, based on states who have implemented this policy, that this policy will likely reduce caseloads by at least 10 percent. Other reforms that make it easier for individuals on supervision to secure employment and incentivize supervision officers to help individuals find employment would make this policy even more effective.⁵⁹

CONCLUSION

States across the country have demonstrated success with earned-time credit policies. Time credits are powerful incentives for individuals to make meaningful progress towards re-entry into their communities. At the same time, by rewarding individuals with time off their sentences, time credits also reduce burdensome caseloads and allow probation and parole officers to focus on higher-risk individuals. The best earned-time credit systems will combine the advantages of the most successful models and tie incentives to desirable ultimate outcomes. An earned-time credit policy that regularly rewards individuals for maintaining stable employment would reduce caseloads and supervision populations without increasing crime, help more individuals get safely back on their feet and into their communities, and reward the proper ultimate outcomes for individuals on supervision.

[1] “Reentry Trends in the United States,” Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 14, 2004. https://www.bjs.gov/content/reentry/releases.cfm.

[2] A handful of states allow judges to add a period of probation following a person’s completion of a prison sentence.

[3] Ibid.

[4] “2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-2014)” Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 2018, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6266

[5] Amanda Essex, “New Report Examines Length of Probation Terms by State,” National Conference of State Legislatures website, January 13, 2021, https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/new-report-looks-at-length-of-probation-terms-by-state-magazine2021.aspx.

[6] Teresa Wiltz, “Doing Less Time: Some States Cut Back on Probation,” Pew Stateline, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/04/26/doing-less-time-some-states-cut-back-on-probation#:~:text=Probation%20sentences%20for%20felony%20property,probation%20sentences%20is%20three%20years.

[7] Bill Burrell, “Caseload Standards for Probation and Parole,” American Probation and Parole Association, https://www.appa-net.org/eweb/docs/APPA/stances/ip_CSPP.pdf.

[8] Arthur Rizer, “Seeking Success: Reforming America’s Community Supervision System,” R Street, July 10, 2020, https://www.rstreet.org/2020/07/10/seeking-success-reforming-americas-community-supervision-system/.

[9] Francis Cullen and Cheryl Johnson, “Rehabilitation and Treatment Programs,” in Crime and Public Policy (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia, eds., 2011).

[10] D. A. Andrews and J. Bonta, The psychology of criminal conduct, 5th ed. (Newark: LexisNexis, 2010).

[11] P. Gendreau, “The principles of effective intervention with offenders,” in A. Harland (Ed.), Choosing correctional options that work (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), pp.117-130.

[12] D. Lester et al.., “Radical behavioral interventions,” in P. Van Voorhis, M. Braswell, & D. Lester (eds.), Correctional counseling & rehabilitation, 5th ed. (New York: Matthew Bender, 2004), pp. 61-82.

[13] “Effective Responses to Offender Behavior,” American Probation and Parole Association, http://www.appa-net.org/eWeb/docs/APPA/pubs/EROBLLPPS-Report.pdf.

[14] The University of Utah, Utah Criminal Justice Center.(2015). Piloting Utah’s Response and Incentives Matrix: Results from Staff and Stakeholder Surveys.

[15] Eric J. Wodahl et al., “Understanding the Perceived Value of Incentives in Community Supervision,” Corrections 3, vol. 2. March 6, 2017, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/23774657.2017.1291314?journalCode=ucor20&

[16] Individuals on supervision typically have to pay a weekly or monthly fee to cover some of the costs of the probation or parole systems.

[17] Individuals on supervision are required to check-in with their probation or parole officers periodically.

[18] Piloting Utah’s Response and Incentives Matrix: Results from Staff and Stakeholder Surveys. The University of Utah, Utah Criminal Justice Center, 2015.

[19] “Missouri Policy Shortens Probation and Parole Terms, Protects Public Safety,” Pew Trusts, Public Safety Performance. August 8, 2016.

[20] Vincent Schiraldi and Michael P. Jacobson, “When Less is More,TheMarshallProject.org. August 28, 2017, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/28/when-less-is-more

[21] “2018 Update on Prisoner Recidivism: A 9-Year Follow-up Period (2005-2014)” Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 2018, https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6266

[22] “States Can Shorten Probation and Protect Public Safety,” Pew Trusts, December 3, 2020, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/2020/12/states-can-shorten-probation-and-protect-public-safety.

[23] Nevada Rev. Stat. § 176a.500 (5), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-176A.html#NRS176ASec500.

[24] Arizona Rev. Stat. § 13-924(2013), https://www.azleg.gov/viewdocument/?docName=https://www.azleg.gov/ars/13/00924.htm

[25] South Carolina Code Ann. §24-21-280 (D), https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t24c021.php

[26] Missouri Rev. Stat. § 217.703.1(2012), http://www.moga.mo.gov/mostatutes/stathtml/21700007031.html. 

[27] Arkansas Code Ann. § 16-93-314, https://law.justia.com/codes/arkansas/2017/title-16/subtitle-6/chapter-93/subchapter-3/section-16-93-314/.

[28] “Missouri Policy Shortens Probation and Parole Terms, Protects Public Safety,” Pew Trusts, August 8, 2016, https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2016/08/missouri-policy-shortens-probation-and-parole-terms-protects-public-safety.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] “Profile of the Institutional and Supervised Offender Population,” Missouri Department of Corrections, June 30, 2019, https://doc.mo.gov/sites/doc/files/media/pdf/2020/03/Offender_Profile_2019_0.pdf.

[32] Individuals in violation of supervision in Missouri but who have not committed crimes can be incarcerated for 120 days without being fully revoked from probation or parole.

[33] Individuals on supervision in Missouri who show signs of substance abuse can be committed to a long-term treatment program without being revoked from probation or parole.

[34] “Profile of the Institutional and Supervised Offender Population,” Missouri Department of Corrections, June 30, 2019, https://doc.mo.gov/sites/doc/files/media/pdf/2020/03/Offender_Profile_2019_0.pdf

[35] This information was obtained from a virtual video conversation with Division Director Julie Kempker and David Edwards, Director of Research, Planning, and Process Improvement on April 14, 2021.

[36] “Getting Technical: Preventing and Responding to Technical Supervision Violations and Misdemeanors,” Texas Public Policy Foundation, December 2019, https://files.texaspolicy.com/uploads/2019/12/18133429/Haugen-Technical-Supervision-Violations.pdf.

[37] Ibid.

[38] “Summaries of Performance Incentive Funding Programs,” Cicero Institute, https://www.ciceroinstitute.org/performance-incentive-funding-programs.

[39] “Probation Performance: How Arizona’s County Probation Departments Increased Public Safety While Saving Taxpayers Millions,” Council of State Governments Justice Center, https://csgjusticecenter.org/2017/03/16/probation-performance-how-arizonas-county-probation-departments-increased-public-safety-while-saving-taxpayers-millions/

[40] “Summaries of Performance Incentive Funding Programs,” Cicero Institute, https://www.ciceroinstitute.org/performance-incentive-funding-programs.

[41] The Safe Communities Act created a performance incentive funding (PIF) program for probation departments that were able to reduce revocation rates. The program was supposed to be funded with savings from reduced incarceration levels, but the 2008 financial crisis prevented the legislature from appropriating any funds for the program.

[42] Griffin, M. L., Hepburn, J. R., & Ginsburg, K.(2013). The Effects of Earned Time Credit on Successful Probation Outcomes: An Evaluation of Maricopa County, Arizona’s Experience. Unpublished.

[43] Texas Code § 1.42A, https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/CR/htm/CR.42A.htm

[44] “Earned and Good Time Policies: Comparing Maximum Reductions Available,” Prison Fellowship, https://www.prisonfellowship.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/GoodTimeChartUS_2018.pdf.

[45] “Report of the Independent Review Committee Report Pursuant to the Requirements of Title I Section 107(g) of the First Step Act (FSA) of 2018 (P.L. 115-391),” December 21, 2020, https://firststepact-irc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/IRC-FSA-Title-I-Section-107g-Report-12-21-20.pdf.

[46] “The Use and Impact of Correctional Programming for Inmates on Pre- and Post-Release Outcomes,” National Institute of Justice, June 2017, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250476.pdf.

[47] “Report of the Independent Review Committee Report Pursuant to the Requirements of Title I Section 107(g) of the First Step Act (FSA) of 2018 (P.L. 115-391),” December 21, 2020, https://firststepact-irc.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/IRC-FSA-Title-I-Section-107g-Report-12-21-20.pdf.

[48] “The Use and Impact of Correctional Programming for Inmates on Pre- and Post-Release Outcomes,” National Institute of Justice, June 2017, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250476.pdf.

[49] “Probation Program Credit,” Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures, https://corrections.ky.gov/About/cpp/Documents/30/CPP%2030.4%20Probation%20Program%20Credit%20.pdf.

[50] Texas Code § 1.42A, https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/CR/htm/CR.42A.htm.

[51] Kathleen Bender, “Education Opportunities in Prison Are Key to Reducing Crime,” March 2,2018, Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/news/2018/03/02/447321/education-opportunities-prison-key-reducing-crime/#:~:text=In%202016%2C%20the%20RAND%20Corporation,one%20generation%20to%20the%20next.

[52] “Evaluation of the Impact of Correctional Education Programs on Recidivism,” US Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 1995,https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/evaluation-impact-correctional-education-programs-recidivism.

[53] Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports,” American Economic Review 94,no. 1, March 2004, https://eml.berkeley.edu/~moretti/lm46.pdf.

[54] S. Lageson and C. Uggen, “How work affects crime and crime affects work over the life course,” in C. L. Gibson and D. M. Krohm, eds., Handbook of life course criminology: Emerging trends and directions for future research (New York: Springer, 2013), pp. 201-212.

[55] C. Uggen and S. Wakefield, “What have we learned from longitudinal studies of work and crime?” in A. Liberman, ed., The long view of crime: A synthesis of longitudinal research. (New York: Springer, 2008), pp. 191-219.

[56] R. J. Sampson and J. H. Laub, Crime in the making: Pathways and turning points through life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[57] J. Verbruggen, A. A. J. Blokland, V. R. Van der Geest, “Effects of employment and unemployment on serious offending in a high-risk sample of men and women from ages 18 to 32 in the Netherlands,British Journal of Criminology 52, 2012, pp. 845-869.

[58] “Probation Program Credit,” Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures, https://corrections.ky.gov/About/cpp/Documents/30/CPP%2030.4%20Probation%20Program%20Credit%20.pdf.

[59] See, for example, “The Rebound Act: Incentivizing Better Performance in Community Supervision,” Cicero Institute, https://www.ciceroinstitute.org/fields/criminal-justice-sa/georgia/white-paper;  and Dick M. Carpenter II, Ph.D., Lisa Knepper, Kyle Sweetland and Jennifer McDonald, “License to Work:  A National Study of Burdens from Occupational Licensing,” Institute for Justice, https://ij.org/report/license-work-2/.